We present an analysis of the determinants of Asia-Pacific banks' extent of derivative activities. Our findings suggest that the probability of financial distress and economies of scale arguments are important in this regard. Further analyses reveal that AsiaPacific dealer banks tend to use more foreign currency derivatives while interest rate derivatives are generally used for hedging purposes. The finding that governmentowned banks tend to have less derivative activities provides some indication of possible moral hazard behaviour in Asia-Pacific banks. Thus, derivative activities of government-owned banks should be monitored more closely to ensure that there is no unwarranted risk taking.
1.

Introduction
There has been a dramatic increase in Asia-Pacific banks' derivative activities in recent years. In April 2004, the daily turnover of over the counter (OTC) foreign currency and interest rate derivatives in the Asia-Pacific region was USD 400,000 million and USD 67,341 million, respectively. Relative to 2001, this represents a 40% increase in the turnover of OTC foreign currency derivatives and 110% increase in the turnover of OTC interest rate derivatives (Bank for International Settlements, 2005) .
Derivatives are used by banks for risk management as well as for trading purposes. While the use of derivatives in non-financial firms has been well studied, considerably less attention has been given to their use in financial firms.. Given the growing importance of banks' derivative activities, several recent studies have investigated whether the determinants of banks' derivative activities are explained by a similar set of variables that explain non-financial firms' derivative activities. Some of these studies focus on small community banks (Carter and Sinkey Jr., 1998) while other studies focus on dealer banks (Shyu and Reichert, 2002) .
Studies investigating the determinants of banks' derivative activities have generally been confined to US banks.
1 This is despite the growing importance of derivative usage in the Asia-Pacific region. Asia-Pacific banks are unique relative to US and European banks as they typically play a more important role in economic growth, especially in the developing Asian economies. Additionally, they have different financial and ownership characteristics. Genay (1998), for example, identifies that Japanese banks are more leveraged, more dependent on deposits as their source of funds and have significantly greater equity investments relative to US banks. Government ownership of banks is also more common in the Asia-Pacific region relative to the US and Europe (Barth et al., 2001) . As such, an investigation of the determinants of the extent of Asia-Pacific banks' derivative activities is warranted.
In our paper, we investigate the determinants of the extent of Asia-Pacific banks'
derivative activities. Our sample of Asia Pacific banks is representative as it includes commercial banks, government owned banks and dealer banks. We find evidence of the probability of financial distress and economies of scale being important in explaining Asia-Pacific banks' derivative activities.
Consistent with previous studies investigating US banks, bank size is not a significant determinant of derivative activities for non-dealer banks. With country dummies, a greater number of independent variables are found to be statistically significant including dividends, long-term interest rate exposure, ownership dispersion and government ownership, supporting the substitutes for hedging, exposure to risks and moral hazard hypotheses. These results are generally consistent with past studies of US banks.
Prior Literature
Theories of Determinants of Banks' Derivative Activities
Finance theory offers several hypotheses to explain why firms use derivatives. These hypotheses suggest that corporate hedging increases firm value by reducing the probability of financial distress, the expected tax liability and underinvestment costs in the presence of market imperfections. Smith and Stulz (1985) show that hedging reduces the probability of financial distress by reducing the variance of a firm's cash flows. Thus, a firm that faces a greater probability of financial distress is more likely to use derivatives. Smith and Stulz (1985) also postulate that a convex tax schedule in the firm's pre-tax income would indicate that hedging reduces the volatility of a firm's cash flows and produces tax benefits. Reduced volatility of cash flows through hedging enables more effective management of tax obligations, thereby increasing firm value.
Myers (1977) Since banks are in the business of managing risk for themselves and for clients, and are the largest users of financial derivatives, investigation of the determinants of derivative usage has also been conducted in the banking industry.
2 However, the use of derivatives by banks is more complicated because often they are derivative end-users as well as dealers. Compared to non-banks, commercial banks are also unique in the sense that they operate in a highly regulated and protected environment (Sinkey Jr. and Carter, 1997) .
Recognising the uniqueness of the banking industry, Sinkey Jr. and Carter (1997, 2000) modify the derivative usage model of Nance et al. (1993) to capture bank specificity with respect to derivative activities. In particular, they suggest that banks' derivative activities can increase bank value by reducing the probability of financial distress, expected taxes and agency costs, or by increasing fee income and enhancing bank-customer relationships. To reflect the highly regulated and protected operating environment of banks, Sinkey Jr. and Carter (1997) introduce the regulatory hypothesis and moral hazard hypothesis as additional explanations of banks' derivative usage. The regulatory hypothesis suggests that banks should only use derivatives when they have sufficient capital to meet regulatory requirements.
Alternatively, the moral hazard hypothesis suggests that riskier banks might refrain from hedging to exploit government deposit insurance 3 or engage in derivative activities for speculative reasons. However, the moral hazard behaviour can be offset or reduced by market or regulatory discipline or both.
2 The previous literature has also looked into the derivative usage in other industries. For example, Tufano (1996) in the gold mining industry, Koski and Pontiff (1999) in the mutual fund industry and Harwick and Adams (1999) in the life insurance industry. 3 Deposit insurance is a government guarantee scheme for deposits to promote the stability of the banking systems, as well as to protect small depositors from losses due to bank failures (DemirgucKunt and Sobaci, 2000) . Demirguc-Kunt and Sobaci (2000) argue that authorities in every country establish a de facto insurance system (either implicitly or explicitly) to prevent bank failures. and Carter, 2000; Gunther and Siems, 2002; Shyu and Reichert, 2002) .
Empirical Literature on the Determinants of Banks' Derivative Activities
Previous studies of the determinants of banks' derivative activities include the following explanatory variables: firm size (to proxy for economies of scale); leverage (to proxy for probability of financial distress); capital (to proxy for regulatory and moral hazard behaviour); interest rate and credit risks (to proxy for risk exposures); net interest margin (to proxy for intermediation profitability); and liquidity and dividend payout (to proxy for substitutes for hedging).
Determinants of Banks' Decisions to Participate in Derivative Activities
The extant literature examining the determinants of banks' decisions to participate in derivative activities suggests that banks that use derivatives are frequently found to be larger and have higher leverage relative to non-user banks (Gunther and Siems, 1995; Sinkey Jr. and Carter, 2000 1991 -1994 , Sinkey Jr. and Carter (2000 examine derivative activities in 1996. In addition to the variables examined by Gunther and Siems (1995), Sinkey Jr. and Carter (2000) include the effect of credit risk and bank holding company. However, they exclude growth opportunities and preference shares.
using derivatives, at least in part, to protect their net interest income. The coefficient on NOTES is positive and significant only for non-dealer banks. This finding supports the hypothesis that derivatives are used by non-dealers as a hedging tool to reduce the probability of financial distress.
The only international study examining financial and regulatory factors that influence the extent of derivative activities is Shyu and Reichert (2002) . They study thirty-two large international dealer banks (including US, European and Japanese banks) during the 1995-1997 period. They focus on international dealer banks because these banks have substantial international activities and are exposed to a variety of risks such as interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk and credit risk.
Shyu and Reichert (2002) report that banks' derivative activities are positively associated with banks' capital ratio, size, maturity gap, and credit rating but inversely associated with bank profitability. Comparing the effect of regulations across countries, they find that commercial banks that are allowed to pursue direct securities activities (i.e. European banks) have less derivative activities relative to banks that are restricted in their ability to pursue direct securities activities (i.e. US and Japanese banks). The European banks allowed to make direct investment in industrial firms have a greater level of derivative activities relative to banks that are restricted in their ability to make such investments. Direct investment in industrial firms provides more opportunities for European banks to cross-sell various types of derivatives.
Hypothesis Development and Variable Definitions
Based on the extant literature, this study hypothesises that the extent of Asia-Pacific banks' derivative activities is a function of the probability of financial distress, underinvestment cost, economies of scale, hedging substitutes, ownership structure, regulatory and moral hazard hypothesis, exposure to risks, intermediation profitability, dealer status and country specific dummies.
Dependent Variable: Extent of Derivative Activities (TDER)
The extent of derivative activities (TDER), the dependent variable, is measured by the ratio of the notional value of outstanding derivative contracts scaled by total assets.
Following Demsetz and Strahan (1997) and Sinkey Jr. and Carter (2000), this study recognises that although the notional value does not reflect either the market value or the risk of the contracts, it is a satisfactory measure of the extent of derivative involvement as there is no available superior alternative measure. In additional analysis, this study also measures the extent of interest rate derivatives (IRD) and foreign currency derivatives (FCD) by the ratio of notional value of outstanding interest rate and foreign currency derivatives scaled by total assets, respectively. 
Independent Variables
Probability of Financial Distress: Leverage (LEV)
7 Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that hedging can reduce the probability of financial distress by reducing the variance of cash flows. Therefore, banks with greater leverage (LEV), hence a greater probability of experiencing bankruptcy, are more likely to use derivatives to a greater extent (Sinkey Jr. and Carter, 2000) . Sinkey Jr.
and Carter (2000) measure leverage as total notes and debentures scaled by total assets. Since not all sample banks report in a disaggregated manner their total notes and debentures, this study employs bank borrowings scaled by total assets as a proxy.
However, as noted by Sinkey Jr. and Carter (1997), the notion that risk management reduces the costs of financial distress may not apply to banks because of deposit insurance. Therefore, this study hypothesises an association between LEV and TDER but does not predict the direction of the association.
Underinvestment Cost: Asset Growth (GRW)
Froot et 
Economies of Scale: Bank Size (SIZE)
Bank size (SIZE) is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Larger banks tend to be involved in derivative activities to a greater extent because they are better able to absorb the cost of managing derivative activities. These include the costs of hiring skilled personnel and the implementation of internal controls. Hogan and Malmquist (1999) also find that smaller banks faced higher transaction costs when using over the counter derivatives. Since larger banks have larger customer bases and greater investment in the technical expertise relative to smaller banks, they are also more likely to deal with derivatives. This is consistent with the suggestion of Demsetz and Strahan (1997) that large banks are better diversified than small banks and they use their diversification advantage to operate with lower capital ratios and pursue riskier activities such as derivative activities.
Bank size can capture many facets of a bank. For example, bank size may also be an inverse proxy for financial distress cost. Smaller banks, relative to larger banks, can benefit more from hedging with derivatives because the cost of bankruptcy for smaller banks is proportionately greater than those for larger banks (Sinkey Jr. and Carter, 2000) . However, this might not apply in the Asia-Pacific banking industry due to government deposit insurance. Therefore, this study hypothesises a positive association between SIZE and TDER.
Substitutes for Hedging
In addition to managing risk using derivatives, Nance et al. (1993) suggest that firms can also manage their risk on-balance sheet by investing in safer (more liquid) assets and limit their dividend payouts.
Liquidity (LIQ)
Since liquid assets can be converted into cash more easily, the danger associated with variable cash flows can be reduced (Sinkey Jr. and Carter, 2000) . As such, liquidity represents a substitute for hedging and a negative association is hypothesised between liquidity (LIQ) and TDER. LIQ is measured as liquid assets (sum of cash, call loans and short-term trading assets) scaled by total assets.
Dividends (DIV)
Banks can use derivatives to hedge to reduce the volatility of their cash flows. This enables banks to payout a higher percentage of income as dividends (than it otherwise would) while ensuring that sufficient cash is available for debt payments (Carter and Sinkey Jr., 1998). Therefore, a positive association is hypothesised between the amount distributed as dividends (DIV) and TDER. DIV is measured as total dividends paid scaled by total assets.
Ownership Structure
Whidbee and Wohar (1999) illustrate that corporate-control and ownership-structure characteristics influence banks' hedging decisions. However, data on ownership structure, such as managerial shareholding, outside directors on the board and percentage shares held by institutional investors, are generally not available for the sample of Asia-Pacific banks.
While US banks are often widely held, ownership and control of Asia-Pacific banks tends to be concentrated. Claessens et al. (2000) highlight that more than twothirds of firms (both banks and non-banks) are controlled by a single shareholder in East Asian countries and that the concentration of control generally diminishes with the country's level of economic development. 8 In addition, government ownership of banks is also prevalent in the Asia-Pacific region (Barth et al., 2001) . Therefore, our study employs ownership dispersion and government ownership as ownership structure measures.
Ownership Dispersion (DISP)
Laeven (2002) 
Government Ownership (GOV)
Laeven (2002) also finds that banks with state ownership tend to take on less risk relative to family-owned and company-owned banks. This is probably due to the government monitoring of banks. Thus, a positive associated between government ownership (GOV) in banks and TDER is hypothesised. GOV is measured by a dummy variable coded one if the government is among the top 10 shareholders of a bank and zero otherwise.
Regulatory Hypothesis and Moral Hazard Hypothesis: Capital (CAP)
Merton and Bodie (1992) suggest that because of regulatory capital requirements, banks must have 'assurance capital' to participate in new activities. They describe assurance capital as a cushion that can serve as an alternative to frequent surveillance by bank regulators. In addition, bank capital may be viewed as a measure of creditworthiness by the market. Jagtiani (1996) argues that higher levels of capital are required for participation in the market for swaps because banks with more capital are viewed as being more creditworthy. The same should be true for other over-the counter instruments (Carter and Sinkey Jr., 1998).
Alternatively, there could be a negative relationship between capital and the extent of derivative activities because of moral hazard behaviour, where banks with low capital ratios tend to be involved in greater derivative activities since they are 9 While Laeven (2002) measures dispersion as a dummy equal to one if no shareholder owns more than 5% shares (and 20% shares in robustness test), the measure of dispersion in this study (dummy equal to unity if no shareholder owns more than 25% shares in banks, zero otherwise), is reported by Bankscope and is the best available consistent measure of shareholder dispersion for Asia-Pacific banks.
protected by government deposit insurance (Besanko and Kanatas, 1996) . However, Konishi and Yasuda (2004) find that rather than increasing risk taking, the implementation of a capital adequacy requirement in 1993 reduced risk taking by Japanese commercial banks. Thus, we hypothesise an association between capital (CAP) and TDER but no prediction is made for the direction of this association. CAP is measured as a bank's book value of equity scaled by total assets.
Risk Exposures
Monitoring from regulators and investors also encourages banks to hedge their various risk exposures (e.g. interest rate risk, exchange rate risk and credit risk)
resulting from their business activities.
Long-term and Short-term Interest Rate Exposures (LTIREXP and STIREXP)
Interest rate risk arises because of duration mismatches resulting from borrowing short and lending long, the traditional business of banking (Sinkey Jr. and Carter, 2000) . Since derivatives are seen as useful tools for risk management, banks with a greater exposure to interest rate risks are expected to use derivatives to a greater extent.
On the other hand, Buser, Chen and Kane (1981) argue that while deposit insurance helps ensure confidence in the banking system, it encourages moral-hazard behaviour, given that banks may take on more risk or speculate with derivatives to exploit the government guaranteed scheme for deposits. However, Carter and Sinkey
Jr. (1998) suggest that moral hazard can be offset or at least reduced by market discipline and/or regulation. Similarly, Hovakimian et al. (2003) where R it is the return on bank stock i in period t; R mt is the return on the market index of the country of bank i in period t; LTIR t is the return on a long-term (7 to 10 years) government bond index; STIR t is the holding period return on three-month Treasury bills or comparable 3-month interest rates; EX t is the rate of change in local currency against the Japanese Yen (JPY) for Malaysia and Hong Kong (since their currencies are pegged to the USD) and against the USD for all other countries. This model is widely used in studies investigating banks' market, interest rate and exchange rate exposures (see for example, Choi and Elyasiani, 1997).
Exchange Rate Exposure (EREXP)
As an extension to Sinkey Jr. and Carter (2000), this study includes exchange rate exposure (EREXP) as a potential determinant of a bank's extent of derivative activities. Exchange rate exposure is included because of its importance to AsiaPacific banks due to their high foreign borrowings. To manage their exchange rate exposure, Asia-Pacific banks can utilise foreign currency derivatives. Thus, a positive association between EREXP and TDER is hypothesised. Similar to interest rate exposure, this study employs the absolute value of the exchange rate coefficient from the augmented market-model, standardised by its standard-error (i.e. absolute value of the t-statistic) as a measure of exchange rate exposure.
Credit Risk (RES)
Following Sinkey Jr. and Carter (2000), we test for the presence of coordinated risk management by banks using loan loss reserves scaled by total assets as a proxy for credit risk (RES). Schrand and Unal (1998) investigate hedging and coordinated risk management used by thrifts to control both credit risk and interest rate risk. If banks are practicing coordinated risk management, then the use of derivatives to hedge interest-rate risk should also be related to banks' credit exposure. Thus, a positive association is hypothesised between RES and TDER.
Intermediation Profitability: Net Interest Margin (NIM)
Banks with high net interest margins will attempt to lock in their "spreads" by using derivatives to hedge (Sinkey Jr. and Carter, 2000) . This suggests a positive association between TDER and the net interest margin (NIM). Alternatively, banks with low net interest margins might attempt to increase fee income by speculating and selling derivative products (Shyu and Reichert, 2002) . Thus, this study includes NIM in the model but it does not predict the direction of the association between NIM and TDER. NIM is measured as net interest income scaled by total assets.
Dealer Dummy (DEAL)
Since dealer banks use derivatives for dealing in addition to hedging, the dealer dummy (DEAL) is used as a control variable. A positive association between DEAL and TDER is hypothesised. Following Sinkey Jr. and Carter (2000), DEAL is coded one if the bank is a primary member of International Swap and Derivative Association (ISDA) and zero otherwise.
Country Specific Dummies
Country Dummies
To control for cross-country differences in institutional and regulatory environments, we include a country dummy coded one if the bank belongs to a specific country and zero otherwise. The country dummies included in the analysis are dummies for Australia (AUSDUM), Hong Kong (HKDUM), Japan (JPDUM), Malaysia (MSDUM), the Philippines (PHDUM), Singapore (SGDUM), South Korea (KRDUM), Taiwan (TWDUM) and Thailand (THDUM).
Activity and Ownership Restrictions (ACT and OWN)
Shyu and Reichert (2002) find evidence that activities and ownership regulations in different countries affect the extent of banks' derivative activities. Accordingly, we measure activity restriction (ACT) using a dummy variable of unity if a country does not restrict banks' ability to participate in direct securities activities, zero otherwise.
Similarly, an ownership restriction dummy (OWN) is coded one if a country does not restrict banks' ability to own shares in non-financial firms, zero otherwise. 11 Since the country specific dummies are employed as control variables, the directions of association between various country specific dummies and TDER are not hypothesised. Table 1 summarises the independent variables, their labels, definitions and predicted signs.
[Insert Table 1 The geographic location of the sample banks is summarised in Table 2 . The Japanese banks make up the largest proportion of the sample (49%), followed by Hong Kong banks (10%). Overall, the sample represents more than 40% of total banks in each country except for New Zealand, the Philippines and Taiwan.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Method
This study employs the Tobit model to investigate the determinants of the extent of Asia-Pacific banks' derivative activities. The Tobit model is employed because the extent of derivative activities (as proxied by the notional value of derivatives scaled by total assets) is censored at zero for a number of observations. Since the data employed are cross-sectional involving multiple countries in the Asia-Pacific region, heteroskedasticity is expected in the error variance. Thus, all regressions are adjusted for 'White's heteroskedasticity consistent covariance standard-errors' to remove 13 Stock price data are not available for these banks because they are either not listed on an organized stock exchange or have merged with other local banks. Stock price data are needed to estimate the interest rate and exchange rate exposures of banks using the augmented market model over the period of January 1999 to December 2003. In addition to stock price data, we also obtained from Datastream, the following weekly data for each sample country: i) equity market index, ii) bond index, iii) shortterm interest rate (3 month) and iv) exchange rate for the same period. interest rate derivatives (IRD) and foreign currency derivatives (FCD) suggests that banks with a higher level of interest rate derivative activities relative to total assets are also more likely to have a higher level of foreign currency derivative activities relative to assets. Multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem in this study since the independent variables included in the Tobit regressions are not highly correlated.
5.
Results and Discussion
Descriptive Statistics
17
[Insert Table 3 about here] 16 Following Sinkey Jr. and Carter (2000), a dealer dummy is included in the analysis to account for any possible bias due to the influence of banks with large derivative activities. There are 26 sample banks with extensive derivative activities (TDER greater than 1) and 93% of these are derivative dealer banks. 17 Additionally, a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) analysis is conducted to detect multicollinearity. As a rule of thumb, multicollinearity becomes harmful when VIF is greater than 10 (Kennedy, 2003) . The VIFs for the independent variables included in our Tobit regressions range from 1.05 to 2.04 -as such, multicollinearity is not a problem in our setting.
Tobit Regression Analysis (without Country Effects)
Variations of the Tobit regression model are tested with the results reported in Table   4 . In the first model (Model 1), the variables proxying the probability of financial distress, underinvestment cost, economies of scale, hedging substitutes, ownership structure, regulatory and moral hazard hypotheses, exposure to risks and intermediation profitability are included. The estimates are corrected for the presence of heteroskedasticity. The results show that LEV, a proxy for the probability of financial distress, is positive and statistically significant. This corroborates previous findings that banks with higher leverage engage in greater derivative activities to minimise the probability of financial distress (Sinkey Jr. and Carter, 2000) . Consistent with the predicted sign, SIZE is also a significant determinant of derivative activities.
Large banks have the scale and scope necessary to justify the expenditure of resources to manage extensive derivative activities (Sinkey Jr. and Carter, 2000; Shyu and Reichert, 2002) .
In contrast to their predicted signs, a negative coefficient estimate is found for GOV and GRW. These results indicate that banks with higher growth opportunities and with government ownership tend to hedge less relative to banks without these characteristics. These results reflect possible moral hazard behaviour of Asia-Pacific banks. The banks may not hedge adequately, knowing that they can rely on government deposit insurance to bail them out in the event of insolvency. LIQ is marginally significant at the 10% level. However, the positive sign obtained is inconsistent with the liquidity as a substitute for hedging hypothesis. This hypothesis is also not supported in previous US studies (Gunther and Siems, 1995; Sinkey Jr. and Carter, 2000) . Consistent with Sinkey Jr. and Carter (2000), the positive sign for LTIREXP indicates that banks with greater interest rate risk tend to engage in greater derivative activities.
Model (2) incorporates a dealer dummy to control for the existence of large derivative users due to their dealing activities. The results are consistent with Model
(1) with LEV, SIZE and GOV remaining statistically significant at the 5% level, and LTIREXP at the 1% level. DEAL is also statistically significant indicating that AsiaPacific dealer banks use derivatives more extensively than non-dealer banks.
Model ( [Insert Table 4 about here]
Tobit Analysis with Country Effects
The analysis is then extended to include country effects. As in Shyu and Reichert (2002), we include ACT and OWN to capture cross-country differences in bank regulations. Among the sample countries, participation in direct securities activities is unrestricted in all countries except Thailand. Countries that do not restrict bank ownership in non-financial firms are Hong Kong, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand (World Bank, 2004) . As presented in Table 4 Model (4) 
Extended Analyses and Robustness Checks
Japanese vs. Non-Japanese Banks
Since the sample consists of a large number of Japanese banks, the analysis is also partitioned into separate Japanese and non-Japanese banks. The regression results are presented in Table 5 . Model (7) is for the sub-sample of Japanese banks only and
Model (8) for the sub-sample of non-Japanese banks. Explaining derivative activities of Japanese banks, only LEV significantly influences the level of derivative activities.
This suggests that Japanese banks generally employ derivatives to reduce their probability of financial distress. For the sub-sample of non-Japanese banks, controlling for country dummies, more variables (i.e. LEV, SIZE, LIQ, DIV, DISP, GOV and LTIREXP) are found to influence TDER.
Risk Exposure by Derivative Type
To further examine the determinants of the extent of banks' derivative activities, TDER is disaggregated into interest rate derivatives (IRD) and foreign currency derivatives (FCD). The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5 , Model (9) for IRD and Model (10) [Insert Table 5 With the inclusion of country dummies, more independent variables are found to be associated with banks' level of derivative activities. These include dividends, ownership dispersion, government ownership and long-term interest rate risk exposure, and support the substitutes for hedging, the moral hazard and the exposure to risks hypotheses. These results are generally consistent with previous US studies.
Further investigation of the extent of IRD and FCD suggests that dealer banks tend to use more FCD, while IRD are generally used for hedging purposes.
Our findings indicate that banks generally engage in derivative activities to reduce the probability of financial distress. However, the findings that banks with government ownership tend to have less derivative activities indicate some moral hazard behaviour amongst Asia-Pacific banks. This suggests that it may be prudent to more closely monitor the risk management activities of banks with government ownership to ensure that risk taking is not excessive. Table 1 for a description of explanatory variables. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. White adjusted statistics are reported. In the IRD (FCD) model, IRD (FCD) is used as the dependent variable in place of TDER in the above Tobit regression. In Models (7) to (10), only relevant country dummies are included in the Tobit regression. Deal dummy is excluded from the "Japanese bank only" model due to the high correlation with leverage to address potential multicollinearity problem. The sample consists of 110 and 108 Asia-Pacific banks for 2002 and 2003, respectively. Refer to Table 1 for a description of explanatory variables. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. White adjusted statistics are reported.
